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ABSTRACT
When monthly data on production, prices, and the money stock are interpreted,
via a vector autoregression, as generated by dynamic responses to "surprises" in
each of the variables, a remarkable similarity in dynamics between interwar and
postwar business cycles emerges, though the size of the "surprises" is much larger
in the interwar period. Furthermore, the money stock emerges as firmly causally
prior, in Granger's sense, in both periods and accounts for a substantial frac—
tion of variance in production in both periods.
When a short interest rate is added to the vector autoregression, the remarkable
similarity in dynamics between periods persists, but the central role of the money
stock surprises evaporates for the postwar period. While there are potential mone—
tarist explanations for such an observation, none of them seem to fit comfortably
the estimated dynamics. A non—monetarist explanation of the dynamics, based on the
role of expectations in investment behavior, seems to fit the estimated dynamics
better. That this explanation, which is consistent with a passive role for money,
could account for so much of the observed postwar relation between money stock and
income may raise doubts about the monetarist interpretation even of the interwar
data.





(612) 373—5447I. Monetarists and evidence
I take monetarists to be the view that monetary policy is of central
importance in the business cycle and that the time path of the money stock
is a good single index of monetary policy. As set forth by Milton Fried-
man and Anna Schwartz
,monetarismemphasizes the relation of the
level of the money stock to the level of aggregate real economic activity,
without a detailed theory of why money fails to be neutral in the short
run. In its more recent guise, as surveyed recently by Barro
monetarists develops an explicit basis for non—neutrality by positing bar-
riers to information flow about prices.
Whether in its earlier or more recent form, monetarists claims support
in the observed behavior of aggregate economic time series. At least over
some time periods, the money stock and income are highly correlated. Such
correlation, while it is an implication of the theory and hence corroborates
it, is easy to explain as non—causal, representing a passive response of the
money stock to real activity. Friedman therefore has documented
a tendency for movements in the money stock or its rate of change to precede
movements in aggregate activity. This is a more complicated implication
ofthe theory, and hence isstronger corroboration than the correlation by
itself.It isalso harder to explain as a passive response of the money stock
to real activity. James Tobin, however, showed that such timing
patterns could be explained by a model in which money played a passive role.
Friedman and Schwartz did not rely only on statistical timing relation-
ships, however. Through detailed analysis of historical episodes,they attempted
to document the existence of major swings in the money stock which not only
preceded major swings in real activity, but were not themselves reflex responses
to developments in real activity. In the postwar period, though, the relatively
smooth behavior of the money stock, and the acceptance by the governnent of—2—
full—employment goals make isolation of convincingly "non—reflex" movements
in :the money stock very difficult. At the same time, the pre—war episodes
involve, for the most part, banking panics and international capital movements.
The panics, at least, are almost inevitably sudden and unanticipated, but
neither they nor the capital movements are ordinarily without antecedents in
real economic activity. Furthermore, even to the extent one accepts such
episodes as shocks to the money stock which produced subsequent real develop-
ments, it is not obvious that one should extrapolate the dynamics of such
events to the postwar period, where the movements in the money stock are at least
thought to represent deliberate government policy moves to a much greater
extent. Thus my 1972 demonstration that the money stock could be taken as
exogenous in GNP on money stock distributed lag regressions was an important
piece of support for the monetarist position. Despite the possibility that
a substantial part of money—GNP correlation in the postwar period represented
policy responsás to developments in the economy, the data showed no evidence
of such feedback; the observed statistical correlations and timing relationships
were consistently interprable as representing entirely causal effects of money
on income.
Modern rational—expectations monetarism has shifted attention away from
structural intefpretation of distributed lag regressions of GNP on money stock.
Nonetheless the fact that the money stock is causally prior to GNP in Cranger's
sense in postwar U.S. data is important for the modern monetarist position.
Rational—expectations monetarism suggests that it is the surprises in movements
in the money stock which generate non—neutrality.This implies a difference
in the way data are examined for support for the monetarist position. Instead
of finding the percentage of variation in real activity which can be explained
by a distributed lag on the levels of the money stock, one looks—3—
for the percentage which can be explained by a distributed lag on surprises in
the money stock. Now when "surprise" is taken to mean "innovation" in the tech-
nical time series sense of "the prediction error in a best linear predictor," it
is easy to show that Granger causal priority Qf the money stock amounts to the
equivalence of the percentages of variance in GNP accounted for by a distributed
lag on the money stock and by a distributed lag on money stock surprises. Rational
expectations monetarism yields a drastically different economic interpretation of
the coefficients in distributed lag regression of output on money, but it gives
the same interpretation to the substantial fraction of variance explained by such
regressions. With money Granger causally prior, this fraction of variance
represents under new or old monetarist views an unnecessary source of variability
which could be eliminated by reform to make monetary policy more predictable.
Innovation accounting for interwar and postwar data
A multivariate linear time series model generates, according to the Woid
Decomposition theorem, a representation of each series in the model as a linear
combinationof current and past innovations in the variables in the system. These
innovations are by construction serially uncorrelated, and if they are transformed
to be contemporaneously uncorrelated as :Well, variance in the variables in the
system can be unambiguously decomposed into components attributable to each innova-
tion. The results reported in this paper come from autoregressive systems linear
in the logs of the varlables,using twelve lags of each variable, monthly data, and
a constant term but no trend term. Estimation was by unconstrained least squares.
The "postwar" period refers to 1948—78, using1 data on 1947 for initial
conditions, while the "interwar" period refers to 1920—41, using data on
1919 for initial conditions.—4.-
Table 1 shows that data on money, industrial production, and wholesale prices
fit, in most respects, a familiar monetarist mold. For both periods, money is
nearly entirely accounted for by its own innovations ——i.e.behaves as if Granger
causally prior. Tests of the hypothesis that all 12 lagged values of industrial
production or of prices have zero coefficients in the money equation easily accept
the null hypothesis. The smallest marginal significance level on these four F—tests
is .18, confirming that the upper left corner of Table 1 is insignificantly dif-
ferent from 100 in both periods. Money innovations explain a substantial fraction
of variance in industrial production in both periods, with the fraction notably more
substantial in the interwar period The fraction of price variance attributable
to money innovations for the postwar period is smaller than what I had found in the
earlier work with quarterly data already cited; this may be due at least in part
to the use here of the more volatile WPI in place of the implicit price deflator,
so that the long—run component of price variance is a smaller portion of the total.
In both periods the patterns:of response of the system to innovations in
the variables largely fit the monetarist framework. Production and prices respond
positively to money innovations, both responses being smooth in both periods. Somewhat
at variance with rational—expectations monetarism is the lackof a tendency for
production responses to money to be temporary in either period. Though both periods'
responses peak at about 18 months, neither has decayed to half its peak level after
four years. Despite the tendency of monetary shocks to persist in both periods,
price responses in the interwar (not the postwar) period do show up as temporary,
with the price response gone after four years. Production responses to a given
shock in the log of money are larger in the postwar period, and price responses are-5-
smaller. This type of result has been interpreted in some recent work
as evfdence of greater price rigidity postwar, yielding greater real effects
of given nominal surprises.
The most striking difference between the periods is in the variances of
the innovations. Innovations in the log of money have a larger variance in the
Interwar period by a factor of about 22, for prices the factor is about 13.5,
and for production the factor is 5. This fits the monetarist story that larger
real fluctuations should be associated with larger monetary surprises, though the
large difference in production innovation variances suggests that not all of
the difference between periods is attributable to monetary policy and institutions ——
asmost monetarists would certainly agree. Contemporaneous correlations among
innovations are all much weaker in these monthly data than in quarterly data. For
the postwar period they are all at most marginally significantly different from
zero; for the interwar period output innovations have significant correlations of
.22 and .30, respectively, with money and prices.
The monetarist interpretation of these results could be. explored in more depth,
but let us turn instead to the more exotic pattern of results which emerges when short
interest rates (the rate on 4—6 month. prime commercial paper) are introduced into
the system. I had found in earlier work with larger (9—variablei systems of quarterly
data for the U.S. and Germany and of annual data for the U.Sq that the proportion
of variance in real variables attributable to money innovations shrank considerably
in the larger systems.I had not been sure of the source of the difference between
the larger and smaller systems. Meditation on the results of Yash Pal Mehra
who showed that money's causal priority clearly evaporates in systems including
an interest rate, led me to try a system with the added interest rate variable to
see if the behavior of this variable would fit into the monetarist story about the
data.
As Mehra's results would lead one to expect, Table 2 shows that with interest
rates included, the money stock is no longer strongly Granger causally prior. This—6—
result is in itself not counter to the monetarist position; the strikingly
non—monetarist aspect bf Table 2 is that in the postwar period at the 48
month horizon only four percent of the variance of production is accounted for
by money innovations. If this result is taken at face value, a rational expecta-
tions monetarist must admit that surprise changes in the money stock have in
fact played a trivial role in postwar business cycles, that therefore imposition
of a monetarist rule to make the quantity of money more predictable could have
had little real effect.
If one examines the moving average representation (partially described in
Table 3) in detail, one finds that the response of the log of production to a sur-
prise unit increase in the log of the interest rate is essentially zero for about
6 months, followed Thy a smooth decline reaching a minimum around 18 months, with
the minimum at —.17 with interwar data and at —.23 with the postwar data. After 48
months the output response has in the interwar data begun to turn back down again,
being by this point —.20, and in the postwar data it has begun turning back up,
being —.12. For the log of money stock, responses to an upward unit surprise in
the log of interest rate are also in the form of a sustained, smooth decline.
The shapes of these responses are similar across periods and their differences are
marginally statistically significant at most, as can be seen from Table 3.
Thus in both periods some of the observed co—movements of industrial production
and money stock are attributed o common responses to surprise changes in the
interest rate. With this shift in attribution, surprise changes in the money
stock are left with a very small role in explaining production variance in
the postwar period.
Though there is not space here to discuss Table 3 in detail, it is worth
noting a few things about it. In nearly every case, estimated response patterns
are smooth in between the points for which. data are displayed. While the responses—7—
are broadly similar, there are apparently important differences in the responses
of interest rates to money and production, both these responses being much stronger
in the postwar period. Also, response of production to prices is significantly
negative in the postwar period in the first year, and is not negative in the
first year in the interwar period. Because of the computationalexpense, standard
errors have not yet been calculated for the interwar responses, so some of these
apparently significant differences between the periods may not be in fact. A
chi—squared test for constancy of the dynamics, scaling residual variances in the
triangularized autoregression to be constant across periods, yields a x2(202)=
378.2 .Whilethis would certainly reject the null hypothesis of constancy
if the asymptotic distribution tIeory were taken seriously, it is smaller than
the Akaike criterion whichaimsat rejecting only restrictions "false
enough" to increase mean square prediction error.
Possible monetarist explanations
A rational expectations monetarist, to avoid the conclusion that monetary
policy surprises are not important in explaining the real component of postwar
business cycles, must argue that in the results described above monetary policy
surprises are being mismeasured. One possibility is that interest rate and monetary
surprises are being confounded. The decompositions in Table 2 use a triangular
orthogonalization of the innovations, in effect attributing to effects of interest
innovations, and so on down the list displayed in the Tables in the order interest,
money, prices, production. This ordering was chosen because it maximizes the
extent to which inter—period differences show up as differences in innovation—variances
rather than differences in responses to innovations. However, because thepostwar data
yield such small correlations among innovations, the results that money innovations
account for a trivial proportion of production variance is robust to the ordering
of the orthogonalization. In other words, there is not much relation in the data
between interest and money surprises.—8—
But the innovations might be inismeasured because the time unit is wrong.
If the time delay relevant to rational expectations business cycle theory is longer
than a month, it may be that some of the true money stock surprise shows up spur-
iously as interest rate surprise with this fine time unit. This possibility seems
ruled out, however, by the fact that the decompositions of variance with annual
data show precisely the same anti— monetarist phenomenon ——moneysurprises account
for less than ten percent of output variance when an interest rate is included
in the system..
What about the possibility that some people in fact often anticipate policy—
induced movements in the money stock? In this case one might expect the interest
rate to rise in anticipation of forthcoming monetary tightness. If in addition
the true time de1ayrelevant to the rational expectations theory exceeds a month,
one might then get the pattern of results we have displayed. This lineof argument
deserves further exploration, but it is not immediately clear that it can avoid
internal contradictions. It certainly requires that some economic agents ig-
nore published information on current interest rates.
A monetarist not maintaining the rational expectations stance might have
an easier time explaining the results. If one is not claiming that changes inthe
money stock must be unanticipated in order to have areal effect, the notion that
some money stock changes are anticipated,are therefore preceded by upward move-
ments in short interest rates, and nonetheless have real effects just as if they
were unanticipated, is quite acceptable. In fact one reason that this might happen
leaps tomind.2 Change in base money might be transmitted to the stock of cur-
rency and demand deposits only with a delay, while having quick effects on
the interest rate.—9 —
Whenthepostwar systemis estimated with reserves or base money re-
placing the money stock, however, almost precisely the same pattern of results
emerges. The percentages of variance in industrial production explained by
money innovations remainator below 10 percent. The only notable difference
is that base money, unlike currency plus demand deposits orreserves, shows
no negative response to interest rate innovations; production still shows
the same negative response to interest—rate innovations in thesystem with
base money.
More generally, there is another difficulty with interpreting irterest
rate innovations as simply anticipated movements in the money stock. For both
interwar and postwar data, the price level responds to money shocks with a
steady price inflation over a year, while interest rate shocks, despite their
effects on money supply, produce no substantial effect on prices. If interest
rate innovations are simply anticipated money stock innovations, it is hard
to see why they should affect prices so differently. Of course the rational
expectations monetarist view does predict a difference here, but of the
-oppositesort ——anticipatedmoney stock changes should have more effect on
prices.
Inthe interwar years there were "panics" and in the postwaryears there
were "liquidity crunches." If these are interpreted as shifts in the public's
-preferencestoward cash, away from deposits, they might be the source of the observed
response to interest innovations. If,asthe public tries to convertdeposits
tocash, the Federal Reserve responds weakly or not at all with injections of
reserves, one would expect a quick rise in interest rates, a fall in the money
stock, and a decline in output as if there had been a deliberate monetary tighten-
ing. This story is not "monetarist" in the sense I gave theterm at the outset,
in that it does not attribute the observed pattern to surprises in monetary—10—
policy directly. On the other hand, this story is in the spirit of Friedman
and Schwartz's own discussion of the depression, in which they claim not that
the initial shocks came from arbitrary monetary policy, but rather that failure
of monetary policy to respond appropriately to shocks originating elsewhere
magnified the effects of those shocks.
This explanation is not implausible to me. It does have defects. It
leaves open the question of why price responses to this type of shock are
different from those to innovations in money supply. It seems to require that
the monetary authorities in the postwar period respond in almost the same
pattern to an increased demand for cash as did the monetary authorities in
the interwar period, which might seem implausible. And it leaves unexplained
the origin of these sudden, cyclically important shifts in the demand for cash:
A non—monetarist expectational theory to fit the facts.
A Keynesian view of the business cycle centers attention on the relation
of capital purchases to expectations of future profitability. As is now widely
understood, in order for expectations of the future to play the central role
in investment behavior which Keynesian theory gives them, it must be costly to
adjust the capital stock rapidly. The theory which emerges is much the same,
whether one has adjustment costs internal to the firm or external, in the form
of a capital goods industry with increasing costs. In the latter case, firms
which are capital—goods pricetakers will have as an equilibrium condition
r =kk+—11—
where is the effective price of capital goods (including discounts, the
cost of obtaining prompt delivery, etc.) r is the instantaneous interest rate,
and V is the real marginal product of a physical unit of capital. Suppose informa-
tion becomes available indicating that the real yield on capital,V
,willde-
cline at some point several months from now. It seems plausible that this would
lead to a drop in the rate of investment, and hence to a drop in If this
drop in investment is persistent over several months, must remain small in-
itially. From (*) above we can see that this means that r must rise.
This story does of course depend on some implicit assumptions. If is
held rigid either by a very flat capital—goods supply curve or by a rate of
saving whih is insensitive tà returns, even over the short run,then (*) will
be satisfied by a persistently tight link between r andir .Knowledgeof a future
decline in iT could not then raise current r.
Clearly this story fits the response of production to interest rate innova-
tions, in particular to the 6—month period following the shock, inboth interwar
and postwar response patterns, during which production remains flat. The observed
responses of money stock to the interest shocks could simplybe the tail following
the dog: non—monetary economic developments raise interest rates, then push pro-
duction down; and the demand for money declines smoothly in response, as standard
theories lead one to expect.
This theory explains the similarity in response to interest shocks across
periods by similarity in the short run supply elasticity for capital goodsand
similarity in short—run yield—elasticities of savings. This seems more plausible
to me than the similarity of persistent patterns of monetary policy errorswhich
the monetary theories seem to require. The theory does not directly explain
why price—responses to interest and to money—stock innovationsshould be different,—12—
but such differences are certainly no paradox from the point of view of the
theory. For monetarist theories, the absence of price response to a change
in money stock following an interest rate surprise does seem a problem.
It should be noted that this theory Is not contradictory to the inter-
pretation of interest rate shocks as representing "liquidity crunches." The
interest—rate surprise in this theory represents a surprise decline in valua-
tion of existing assets while current real productivities of capital remain
high. Onewouldexpect such a situation to result in problems in maintaining
collateral for ba.nk'loans and complaints that loans for legitimate working
capital purposes are available only at high interest rates.
Conclusions and implications
- - -
Certainlythe theory put forth in the preceding section must at this point
have only the status of an interesting working hypothesis. It should also be noted
that, despite elements giving it a Keynesian flavor, it has no direct implications
for whether active countercyclical monetary or fiscal policy can have good effects,
or any effects .
Evenas a working hypothesis, though, the theory raises some interesting
issues. The theory treats an historically reliable pattern of dynamic statistical
relations, whibh look like causalrelations ought to look, as reflectiveof the
workingsof anticipations through financial markets. It has long been recognized
(aspointed out in some detail in my 1977 paper ) thatprices of
freely traded durable goods, including especially financial assets, should behave
to a close approximation as if "Granger causally prior" to any time series observable
by market participants. The stock of money is not the price of an asset,
and we are used to thinking of it as determined by the Federal Reserve, with shifts
in demand for money having little immediate impact on the stock. But the demand
for thoney ought certainly—13—
in principle to be related to the value of existing assets. If we view the
stockof money as quickly responsive on amonth,to—month basis to shifts in
demand for it, the prospect arises that distributed lag regressions of pro-
duction on money have predictive value for the same reason that similar re-
gressions using stock prices do. A theory which rigorously developed this
possibility would amount to a stochastic version of Tobin's "Money and Income:
Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc?" Exploring the implications of theory in this line
seems to me a major item on the agenda for macro—economic research. Money
innovations after all still seem to explain most of the interwar business
cycle. Is this because surprises in monetary policy were really more important
in that period, -or would the result evaporate in a model which treated monetary
surprises symmetrically with a wider array of financial surprises?Table 1
Three—Variable Innovation Accounting





Ml 92/97 4/2 4/1
IP 66/37 28/44 6/18
WPI 38/14 19/7 43/80
Table 2
Four—Variable Innovation Accounting




Explained R Ml WPL Ip
.
R 63/50 28/19 7/4 1/28
Ml 39/56 58/42 1/1 1/1
WPI 1/2 54/32 43/60 3/6
IP
-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 NOTES ON THETABLES:





If we then choose a lower triangular
matrix B such that Be has a diagonal covariance matrix and B has ones
on its diagonal, we can replace A by C =AB1and e by fBe, to obtain
Z.C f . ts=Os t—s
For thelinear model fit to logs of the variables of this paper, the coefficients
in C are:what is reported in Table 3 as "responses to innovations." The variance—
covariance matrix of x —E(xtlxt_k,Xt_k_lT ...),thek—period—ahead forecast
of x, is given by
k
IV = EB Vár(f )B' k s0 s ts -
Thisformula, with k=48, is used to generate Tables 1 and 2. The approximate
standard errors in Table 3 were generated by Monte—Carlo integration of: the
likelihood, and correspond to the standard errors of Bayesian posterior
distributions with a flat prior. They are approximate not mainly because of
their Monte Carlo source, but rather mainly because they were generated with the
data orthogonalized in a different order than that used to generate the
responses tabulated. Because of the near—orthogonàlity of the postwar residuals,
this makes little difference to the responses, but it does affect the standard
errors of first and second period responses quite a bit, in percentage terms.Data Sources
All postwar data are from the Citibase data base maintained on the TROLL
system at MIT. Definitions and primary sources are: Ml: Currency plus demand
deposits, seasonally adjusted; Federal Reserve. R: Rate on prime commercial
paper, 4—6 months; Federal Riserve. IP: Industrial production, total index,
seasonally adjusted; Federal Reserve. P: Producer price index for finished
goods, seasonally adjusted; Bureau of Labor Statistics.
For the interwar data, definitions and sources are as follows: Ml: Currency
plus demand deposits, seasonally adjusted; Friedman and Schwartz. R: Rate
on prime connnercial paper, 4—6 months; Banking and Monetary Statistics, a volune
published by th& Federal Reserve Board. IP: Industrial production, total index,
seasonally adjusted; from the Federal Rkserve Board publication Industrial
duction, 1971. P: Wholesale price index; total index from a 1970 mimeographed
BLS release.FOOTNOTES:
1Space limitationsprevent my providing adequate documentation of
the methods used, or even of the statistical results. The methods
are described in more detail in my 1978 and 1980 papers. I intend
that the results will be presented in more detail ina forthcoming
discussion paper. Estimation was carried out with the assistance of
Thomas Doan, using his recently minted program for econometric time
series analysis, RATS.
leaped to my mind, howeveronly after Robert Gordon had pointed
it out to me. -REFERENCES:
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